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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
DISCONNECTION OF CERTAIN 
) 
TERRITORY FROM HIGHLAND 
TOWN 
) 
) 
HIGHLAND TOWN, 
) 
Appellant, 
) 
vs. 
GIBBONS REALTY COMPANY, ) Case No. 18191 
et al., 
) 
Respondents. 
) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a statutory proceeding under 10-2-501 Utah Code Annotated 1953 
for disconnection from Highland Town (now Highland City) of approximately 
131 acres of real property. 
LOWER COURT'S DISPOSTION OF CASE 
Following a trial, the court ordered (R. 159) that the property be 
disconnected, that neither party was to pay to the other any sum as a result 
of the disconnection (except that the petitioners were to pay property taxes 
prorated to the date of the order of disconnection), that Highland Town 
should file with the Secretary of State and the Utah County Recorder 
appropriate amendments to the articles of incorporation, and that certain costs 
were to be borne by the petitioners. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the order of the disconnection. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Highland Town was incorporated in August 1977 (R. 196). Included in 
the incorporated area was a rectangle owned by the petitioners on the eastern 
edge of ·a peninsula extending east of the main portion of the city. 
Petitioners 1 property contained approximately 131 acres of a total of 
approximately 2,142 acres witJ?.in the city (R. 65). 
On June 2, 1978, this proceeding was initiated by the owners of all of 
the property in the 131 acre area, viz. , Utah Power and Light Company, 
Gibbons Realty Company, John K. Hayes, Lillian Y. Hayes, David R. Hayes, 
Gerny J. Hayes, Robert D. Hayes, and Virginia D. Hayes. 
A number of facts were established by the terms of a pretrial order 
entered on February 11, 1980: the description of the property sought to be 
disconnected ("the territory"); Highland City has no sewer system; the 
territory is part of a peninsula extending east of the remainder of Highland 
City; all of the described territory has been zoned by Highland City as 
residential property, but none of it has been used as such; the petitioners 
are all of the property owners within the described territory; there are no 
registered voters or any other persons living within the territory; and 
disconnection of the territory will not effect the ability of the City to pro vi.de 
police protection or fire protection to other areas of the City (R. 65-66). 
Evidence was presented to the court respecting the various factors set 
out in 10-2-503 Utah Code Annotated 1953, including projected streets or 
public ways, water mains and water services, sewer mains and sewer 
services, law enforcement, zoning, other municipal services, and whether or 
- 2 -
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not the disconnection would result in islands or unreasonably large or varied 
shape peninsular land masses. 
Existing or Projected 
Streets or Public Ways 
The only public roads in the territory are State Road 92 and State 
Road 146, both of which are maintained by the State of Utah. There is a 
dirt road established and maintained on its own property by Utah Power and 
Light Company (TR. 68-71). Except for the state roads, the only access to 
the Gibbons Realty Company property is by way of a road that runs in the 
direction of Alpine City then turns to the east and into the Gibbons Realty 
property from the north, but this route is a long one, exceeding ten miles 
(R. 295), and would require crossing other privately owned property 
(R. 218). The only feasible access to the property of Gibbons Realty is from 
the state road (R. 216-217). There was no evidence presented as to any 
projected streets or public ways within or to the area. 
Water Mains and Water Services 
Highland City does not have a water system. Residents of the city are 
supplied water by Highland Water Company without any involvement by the 
city (R. 272). From the water system there are no laterals that would serve 
the property owned by Gibbons Realty (R. 240), and there was no evidence 
of any laterals to serve property owned by the other petitioners within the 
territory. After this proceeding was initiated, some additional plans were 
projected for the Highland Water Company system, but even under the 
projected plans, at least half of the property in the territory could not be 
served (R. 428). One of the petitioners, Gibbons Realty Company, developed 
- 3 -
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its own water supply in the form of a well costing approximately $100, 000. 
At the time the well was commenced, the company did not know of the plan to 
incorporate Highland Town (R. 201-202). 
Sewer Mains and Sewer Services 
At the time the proceeding was commenced, and as of the date of the 
pretrial order, Highland City had no sewer system (R. 65), and most of the 
city's residents are dependent upon septic tanks for disposal of sewage.--
Subsequent to initiation of the proceeding, Highland City tied into a sewer 
system developed by the Timpanogos Region (R. 272), but the tie-in is on 
the west side of the city, remote from the territory (R. 273). Money for the 
tie-in was committed after the petition was filed (R. 429), and the main would 
have run to the school whether or not the petitioners' property was to be in 
the city (R. 375). 
Law Enforcement 
The Utah County Sheriff is the Highland City Marshall, and his deputies 
are assistant town marshalls. They supply law enforcement services to 
Highland City under a contract, Highland City having no police force of its 
own (R. 266). The duties of the sheriff and his deputies are about the same 
as they were before the town was incorporated. A deputy sheriff works 
contemporaneously as a deputy and a person on contract with Highland City, 
patrolling a particular area (R. 397). 
Zoning 
There was much testimony by officers and residents of Highland City 
that one of the main reasons for keeping the territory within the city was to 
prevent the operation of a gravel pit in the territory, and there was 
testimony that municipalities prefer to control the uses to which nearby 
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property is put, but there is no evidence that the zoning of the property in 
question would be changed if returned to the jurisdiction of Utah County. 
Even if the territory were disconnected, the possibility of any of the 
petitioners having a gravel operation approved is not good (R. 387). The 
property is zoned residential, as is virtually all of the property within 
Highland City, but the territory is not suitable for residential use and there 
is no residential development in it (R. 291). The territory is remote from the 
Timpanogos Region sewer area and the municipal sewer lines and much of the 
area is not suitable for , septic tanks (Exhibit 15), which would be necessary 
for residential use. The lower area of the Gibbons Realty property would not 
be suitable for residences (R. 391). There are no houses or other buildings 
on the property (R. 255), and it is unlikely that anyone would build a 
residence on that part of the property lying next to State Road 92 (R. 263). 
Other Municipal Services 
Highland City has no fire department. It obtains its fire protection 
services under con tract with the City of Alpine, and receives some fire 
protection services from American Fork (R. 263). There are no fire hydrants 
in the area, and in the event of fire, the fire departments would have to use 
pumpers. The main responsibility of the contracted fire departments is to 
fight grass and brush fires (R. 264). The condition of the roads are such 
that Alpine is unable to furnish effective fire protection for part of the 
property lying south of the junction of State Road 92 and State Road 146 
(R. 356). 
Garbage disposal is handled by a private company with whom the 
residents deal directly. The city provides no garbage disposal service 
(R. 274). 
- 5 -
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There are no sidewalks in the area and no subdivisions (R. 274). The 
city map submitted at trial shows that no subdivisions have been platted in 
the area. 
The map attached to the petition and the maps introduced in evidence 
show that there would be no islands or peninsular masses created by the 
disconnection of the property in question. By virtue of the disconnection, 
the city's east side will be less peninsular, rather than more. 
The loss of revenue from the elimination of taxable property would be 
insignificant. Exhibits 5 and 6 show the minimal taxes that were paid on the 
property other than that of Utah Power and Light Company for the purposes 
of Highland City. The testimony of the Utah County Assessor in exhibit 9 
established that the territory represents a very small fraction of the assessed 
valuation of the property in Highland City (R. 247-250). 
The evidence also established that the territory is not needed for the 
future growth ·of Highland City. Since its incorporation, the city has 
annexed additional territory and now has approximately twice the acreage it 
had at the time of incorporation. Its population has increased from seven or 
eight hundred in August of 1977 to about two thousand five hundred at the 
time of trial (R. 276). The "Official Utah County Master Plan Series Land 
Use Element," Exhibit 14, suggests that eight persons per acre is an optimum 
number for a city. At eight persons per acre Highland City, with its present 
acreage, would be able to accommodate a population of over 30, 000. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED ALL EVIDENCE 
RELEVANT TO ITS DETERMINATION OF PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO 
DISCONNECTION. 
- 6 -
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The court, on evidence with respect to which there was no substantial 
dispute, found that the only streets in the territory were two highways 
maintained by the State of Utah, and private ways created and maintained by 
property owners; that there were no publicly owned and operated water mains 
or water services or sewer mains or sewer services extending to, traversing 
upon or planned in any manner to connect to the territory within the 
reasonably forseeable future; that law enforcement in the territory exists to 
the same extent as a part of Highland Town as it did, or upon disconnection 
would; that zoning restrictions now existing on the land probably would be 
essentially the same upon disconnection; that disconnection of the territory 
would not result in islands or unreasonably large or varied shaped peninsular 
land masses; that the territory is considered by town officials to be a future 
location for a water pressure tank and water mains to traverse from the city's 
projected water sources into town; that city officials consider the territory to 
be suitable for a park or a cemetery, or both, but no master plan has 
officially set aside for development of any of these areas for such future 
uses; that since initiation of this action sewer outfall lines have been 
constructed in Highland Town, but no laterals have extended into the 
territory nor is there any plan to take them into the territory in any 
particular location; that fire protection provided to Highland Town is under 
contract with the City of Alpine, and disconnection would eliminate contractual 
responsibility for the area in question and diminish the expense of such 
protection; that commissioners were duly appointed and held a public hearing; 
and that there was no basis for either the petitioners paying any sum to 
Highland Town or Highland Town paying any sum to the petitioners as a 
result of the disconnection, except that the petitioners should pay taxes for 
the current year, prorated as of the date of the final order of disconnection. 
- 7 -
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On the basis of its findings of fact the court entered the following 
conclusions of law: 
1. Disconnection of the territory will not leave the 
municipality with a residual area within its boundary for which the 
costs, requirements, or other burdens of municipal service would 
materially increase over previous years over which it would become 
economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a 
municipality, and disconnection will not result in islands or 
unreasonably large or varied shaped peninsular land masses within 
or projecting into the boundaries of Highland Town. 
2. Justice and equity require that the territory be 
disconnected from the municipality. 
3. The allegations of the petition are true. 
4. The petitioners are en titled to an order disconnecting the 
territory from Highland City. 
5. There should be no financial contribution either way 
between Highland Town and the property owners in the territory to 
be disconnected, except that taxes for the current year should be 
prorated as of the date of the final order of disconnection. 
It thus appears that the court considered all of the factors enumerated 
in the statute. The city, however, relies upon two statutory clauses as a 
basis for its argument that the court did not consider all of the factors that 
should have been considered in making its determination. The first is a part 
of paragraph (3) of 10-2-501 U. C. A. 1953: 
The officers of the municipality, or any person interested in 
the subject matter of the petition may appear before the court and 
contest the granting of the petition for disconnection by presenting 
the evidence as they deem relevant. [Emphasis added.] 
The other is a clause in 10-2-503 that the court shall consider 11 among. 
other factors" the effect of the disconnection on streets, public ways, water 
mains, water services, sewer mains and sewer services. law enforcement, 
zoning, and other municipal services, and the configuration of the 
municipality after the territory is removed. 
- 8 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Relying on those sections, Highland City attempted to transform this 
disconnection case in to a zoning case. 
Latching onto some isolated wording, the city is asking this court to 
construe 10-2-502 and 10-2-503 as if there were no standards at all for 
disconnection of property from a municipality, and that the court is required 
to take into account any matter that anybody "deems relevant," regardless of 
that person's interest in, or the matter's relation to, the case, and that the 
court must also consider factors which have nothing to do with municipal 
services or the practicality of the municipality continuing to function as such 
if territory is disconnected from it. In urging this construction, the city is 
disregarding well-established rules of statutory construction. 
The first rule it casts aside is the one announced in Cannon v. 
McDonald, 615 P. 2d 1268, 1270 (Utah 1980), that "in interpreting the 
statutory language, care must be taken to construe the words used in light of 
the total context of the legislation." The second is that of noscitur a sociis, 
to the effect that the meaning of terms may be derived from the company they 
keep, the basis of which was pointed out in Heathman y. Giles, 13 Utah2d 
368, 374 P.2d 839, 840 (1962): 
Where there is doubt or uncertainty as to the interpretation of 
a statute there are two well known rules of statutory construction 
which are helpful. The rule of noscitur a sociis, literally "it is 
known from its associates," requires that the meaning of doubtful 
words or phrases be determined in the light of and take their 
character from associated words or phrases. Sutherland in his 
treatise on Statutory Construction states: "* * * Where two or 
more words are grouped together and ordinarily have a similar 
meaning, but are not equally comprehensive, the general words will 
be limited and qualified by the special words." 
The court also discussed the rule of ejusdem generis, also rejected by 
. 
the city, and explained the basis of the two rules: 
- 9 -
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Another closely related rule which is universally accepted as 
valid is that of ejusdem generis, meaning "of the same kind, n which 
rule is that: when general words or terms follow specific ones, the 
general must be understood as applying to things of the same kind 
as the specific . 
These are, of course, neither artifical nor arbitrary rules but 
arise quite naturally from the process of reasoning as to what the 
statute was intended to mean. Common sense and experience teach 
that when a group of related things are specifically enumerated, the 
mind is focused upon that class of things, and that the addition of 
general terms is proposed to avoid inadvertent omission and to 
include like things of the same class . In accord with this is the 
fact that if the broadest meaning of the general expression were 
intended, it would have been sufficient by itself without any use of 
the specific terms . 
Citing Lyman ~· Town of Bow Mar, 553 P.2d 1129 (Colo. 1975), the city 
takes the position that the rule of ejusdem generis does not apply because the 
11 among other things" precedes, rather than follows, the particular words. 
The Colorado court did so state in a case in which the general words used 
had well accepted meanings; and it is also true that the rule of ejusdem 
generis is generally stated as applying to general terms that follow specific 
ones. But this is probably because many statutes are written in just that 
way, and courts recognize that the rule of ejusdem generis is but a particular 
application of the rule of noscitur a sociis. It is the association of the words 
that is important, not whether the general term precedes or follows the 
particular terms . 
In Application of Central Airlines, 185 P. 2d 919, 923 ( Okl. 1947), the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma was faced with the construction of a statute 
where the general term, "shall include" preceded the particular terms defining 
"transportation company." The court said: 
By the rule of construction known as "ejusdem generis," as 
declared in Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County v. Grimes, 
75 Okl. 219, 182 P. 897, "General words do not explain or amplify 
- 10 -
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particular terms preceding them, but are themselves restricted and 
explained by the particular terms." This rule has no literal 
application in the instant case where the general words precede 
those of specification. But it does not follow that the same 
principle does not apply where, manifestly, the specific words have 
reference to the same subject matter as that of the general words. 
That it does so apply is declared in 59 C. J. 980, as follows : 
"So words of general import in a statute are limited by words 
of restricted import immediately following and relating to the same 
subject." 
The underlying authority for such application is to be found in 
the ancient and generally accepted rule of construction known as 
"Noscitur A Sociis" (46 C.J. 496 and cases there cited) which, 
according to Broom's Legal Maxims, means: "The meaning of a 
doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of 
words associated with it." 
In discussing the maximum "ejusdem generis" the Supreme 
Court of Florida, in Ex Parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 12 So. 289, 293, 
following numerous cases cited therein, declared: 
"The maxim is a mere specific application of the broader maxim 
'noscitur a sociis, 1 'which means that general and specific words 
which are capable of an analogous meaning being associated together 
take color from each other, so that the general words are restricted 
to a sense analogous to the less general. 11 
See also 82 C. J. S. , Statutes, §§ 331 and 332, and 14 Words and Phrases 
(Penn. Ed.), pp. 191 et seq. 
The "among other factors" language appears in 10-2-503, the full text of 
which is as follows: 
The court for the purposes of determining whether or not 
territory shall be disconnected shall consider whether or not 
disconnection will leave the municipality with a residual area within 
its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other burdens 
of municipal services would materially increase over previous years 
or for which it would become economically or practically 
unreasonable to administer as a municipality. The court shall 
consider, among other factors, the effect of the disconnection on 
existing or projected streets or public ways, water main and water 
services sewer mains and sewer services, law enforcement, zoning 
' . . 
and other municipal services and whether or not the d1sconnect1on 
will result in islands or unreasonably large or varied shaped 
peninsular land masses within or projecting into the boundaries of 
the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected. 
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The first sentence colors the section as a whole, and indicates a 
legislative intention to protect the city's continued existence, its ability to 
grow, and its ability to continue to perform the services for its inhabitants 
even though part of its territory may be taken away. The factors 
enumerated are those that would have an effect upon the "cost, requirements, 
or other burdens of municipal services," and suggest that the "other factors" 
should also be factors that have an effect upon the economics and practicality 
of continuing to administer the area as a municipality. 
The court made findings of fact with respect to the configuration of the 
city after disconnection of the territory; streets and highways, existing and 
projected; water main and water services; sewer mains and sewer services; 
law enforcement; and zoning, being all of the factors enumerated in 10-2-503. 
It also made findings with respect to ideas of town officials respecting future 
development of the property; fire protection; and possible development of a 
water system and the establishment of park or cemetery. 
The city argues, however, that the court should have taken into account 
e:very factor that the city or those speaking for it "deemed relevant" to the 
proceeding. The court interpreted the statute as requiring it to hear all of 
the evidence that the city wished to produce, but as not requiring the court, 
itself, to attribute relevance to such evidence. This makes sense. It is 
reasonable for the legislature to permit a city to introduce a wide range of 
information, with the thought that by not severely restricting the 
presentation of evidence, there may be matters presented to the court which 
will be relevant to the disconnection. But that is not the same as requiring 
the trial court to deem the evidence relevant, when it is apparent that it is 
based upon mistaken ideas and unsubstantiated fears. 
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In its brief the city argues that the following factors should have been 
given weight by the trial court in determining whether "equity and justice" 
required disconnection : 
1. The opinion of the Mayor that disconnection of the territory 
would hamper the city in carrying out its responsibilities for the peace, 
health, and safety of its residents, that water and air quality would be 
adversely effected and that the homeowners had made investments to preserve 
their home,s "from degradation and anything else that might happen." This in 
the face of other testimony that disconnection itself would have no such 
effect. The Mayor was not talking about the effect of disconnection, but the 
effect of a particular use of the property if, at some future date, the zoning 
authority permitted such use. But, as the trial court recognized, this was 
not an issue in this disconnection case. 
2. In August 1979, after this proceeding was initiated, the city 
entered into a lease agreement with Utah Power and Light Company under 
which the power company leased a portion of its property to the city at $1. 00 
a year and gave the city an option to purchase it. Existence of the lease 
was then used by the city as the foundation for an argument that the Utah 
Power and Light Company property would be part of the city, and 
disconnection would create an island. There may have been other valid 
reasons for the lease, but the action has the appearance of manipulation. 
3. That Mr. Bagley of Gibbons and Reed Company had at one time told 
the town council that the company desired to construct and operate a gravel 
extraction plant and might later desire to include a cement batch plant and an 
asphalt batch plant. Again, this has nothing to do with the question of 
disconnection, since the right of the company to conduct such an operation 
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would depend upon either establishing that right as a pre-existing use, or 
obtaining proper zoning from the authorities, be they officers of Highland 
City or Utah County, or some other political entity. 
4. A public opinion survey as to the type of environment and the 
quality of life the citizens of Highland City desire. As established by the 
other evidence, however, the disconnection of a portion of the city would 
have no effect upon the environment to be found-- within Highland City. The 
disconnection is a political matter that does not affect the physical uses or 
appearance of the property in question. 
5. That one of the petitioners, J. Keith Hayes, testified that he and 
his family had made an effort to get out of the lawsuit, and that they had 
made an "overture" toward being released from the petition for disconnection. 
True ·or not, the Hayeses never took any formal steps to remove their names 
from the petition or io be dismissed from the proceeding, and it is doubtful 
that they would have had a right to do so. Moreover, cross examination of 
Mr. Hayes indicated that the "overture" probably resulted from pressure put 
upon him by the city. 
Q. I take it, Mr. Hayes, that since filing this petition you 
have had some contacts by representatives of Highland City about 
withdrawing from this petition? 
A. I have had a number of them, yes. Several of them, 
yes. 
Q. It has been suggested strongly to you that that is 
something you ought to do, has it not? 
MR. MADSEN: Let me object to the characterization of 
the question. 
THE COURT: Well, its cross examination, Mr. Madsen. 
I '11 let him answer. You may answer Mr. Hayes . 
MR. HAYES: Yes. 
- 14 -
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Q. (By Mr. Roe) And who was it that contacted you first 
do you recall? 
A. I believe most of the contacts had been made by Mayor 
LeBaron. Probably not all of them. 
6. That Utah Power and Light Company had no particular policy 
relating to disconnection matters, and its officer signed the papers as an 
accommodation. But this does not relate to any of the factors that go to the 
justice and equity of disconnecting the property from the city. The evidence 
as to city services and the effects of disconnection are the same regardless of 
the motivation of one or more of the petitioners. 
7. The testimony of Virginia Mathis that she was bothered by trucks 
going past her house. This testimony relates to a condition that presently 
exists in Highland City which is not the responsibility in any way of any of 
the petitioners, and could have no bearing upon the resolution of the 
disconnection question despite the fact that she believes that if there is a 
disconnection there may be more trucks . 
8. The testimony of Gordon Buckley Rose, a Utah County planner, 
that the county would have great difficulty in providing services if the 
territory were "de-annexed." Although he made this general statement, the 
only example he gave was the problem of fire engines turning the corner 
where State Highways 92 and 146 converge, which is the same problem that 
Highland City already has. 
9. Rejection of the testimony of the Mayor of North Salt Lake. The 
proffered testimony was the opinion of the Mayor as to the desirability of 
having gravel operations within the town rather than have them outside and 
not subject to the town's control. This was opinion testimony that had no 
- 15 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
bearing on the question of the disconnection of property from Highland City. 
It represents nothing more than a personal preference of a witness who had 
no interest in the particular proceeding. 
10. The extent to which Gibbons and Reed Company, if permitted to do 
so, might extract and haul sand and gravel along the state highway. While 
this might have an effect upon the question of the zoning of the Gibbons 
Realty Company property, it has nothing to do with the disconnection. As 
testified by Mr. Rose, the county planner, the possibility of one of the 
petitioners getting a gravel operation upon disconnection from Highland City 
was "not good. " 
11. The Mayors of the city and of the intervening cities of Alpine, 
Pleasant Grove, and Linden were of the opinion that there would be an 
advantage for the property in question remaining under Highland City's 
control. No justification was given for this opinion, and it is difficult to see 
its relevance to the question of disconnecting the property. 
The trial court heard virtually all of the evidence that the city and the 
in tervenors wanted to present. After it was presented, however, the trial 
court was required to make a judgment as to whether the evidence was 
material to the disconnection issue in light of the factors set out in the 
statute. The trial court attempted to make a judgment as to the effect of 
disconnection upon the municipality and on its ability to continue offering the 
services that it was obligated to offer as a municipality. It made that 
determination, and made it on the basis of objective evidence as to the 
consequences of disconnection. The city, however, would have the court 
regard the proceeding as one in which the desires of the residents of the city 
. 
should be controlling, in other words, that the proceeding should be a matter 
- 16 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of choosing up sides -- majority wins. Such a construction would raise 
serious constitutional issues. 
II 
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT JUSTICE AND EQUITY 
REQUIRE DISCONNECTION OF THE TERRITORY. 
One of the criteria established by 10-2-502 Utah Code Annotated 1953 for 
disconnection of territory from a municipality is that it shall be required by 
"justice and equity." The statute does not attempt to define what constitutes 
"justice and equity," but this court has recognized that there is a 
relationship between "justice and equity" and the criteria set out in 10-2-503. 
In In the Matter of the Disconnection of Territory and Restriction of the 
Corporate Limits of the City of Draper, Utah, decided· by this court on 
April 27, 1982, but not yet reported, the court said: 
The substantive criteria for determining whether a 
disconnection should be ordered are set out in Utah Code Ann. , 
1953, §10-2-502 and §10-2-503. The former provides that a decree 
of disconnection should be granted if required by "justice and 
equity." Whether the general standard of "justice and equityn has 
been met in a particular case turns in large measure on the facts . 
In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co. , 71 Utah 430, 266 P. 1044 
0928). The varied circumstances of each disconnection case do not 
allow for exact and clear-cut criteria. However, the legislature in 
§10-2-503 has established more specific criteria which are relevant 
in determining whether a disconnection would be consistent with 
justice and equity and sound principles of city planning. That 
section provides: 
10-2-503. Criteria for disconnection. The court for 
the purposes of determining whether or not territory 
should be disconnected shall consider whether or not 
disconnection will leave the municipality with a residual 
area within its boundaries for which the cost, 
requirements, or other burdens of municipal services 
would materially increase over previous years or for 
which it would be economically or practically unreasonable 
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to administer as a municipality. The court should 
consider, among other factors, the effect of the 
disconnection on existing or projected streets or public 
ways, water mains and water services, sewer mains and 
sewer services, law enforcement, zoning and other 
municipal services and whether or not the disconnection 
will result in islands or unreasonably large or 
varied-shaped peninsular land masses within or projecting 
into the boundaries of the municipality from which the 
territory is to be disconnected. 
Prior to 1971, the specific criteria for disconnection were not included in 
the statute. They were added by Chapter 10, § 1, Laws of Utah 1971. 
Previously "justice and equity" had been the only statutorily prescribed 
criteria. 
Nevertheless, this court had applied factors very much like those now 
appearing in 10-2·503, recognizing that "justice and equity" are related to the 
ability of the city to continue to carry on its functions in a reasonable 
manner after disconnection of territory. 
In In re Peterson, 87 Utah 144, 48 P. 2d 468 (1935), the court reversed 
a disconnection decree on procedural grounds, but in doing so discussed one 
factor that might be considered in determining "justice and equity," saying: 
The mere fact that the town of Moab would lose its income 
heretofore derived from the taxation of the land in question does 
not justify the refusal of petitioner's application to have his land 
segregated from the town. 
The case was tried again, and again the court held that the property 
should be disconnected. Again the city appealed, and in Application of 
Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66 P.2d 1195 (1937) the court listed some of the 
criteria to be considered in determining whether to disconnect territory from 
a municipality. Upholding the trial court's disconnection decree, this court 
said: 
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* * * The land is located on the western boundary of the 
town; it is agricultural in character; has never been used for any 
other purpose than to raise hay and other fann products; it has no 
residents on it except a small shack erected without permission of 
the owner. The town has a sewer system and waterwork system, 
both of which have been constructed and the indebtedness to pay 
for the same incurred since the petition for severance was filed. 
The sewer is located at too high an elevation to serve any part of 
the severed land. City water is available to the land but it can be 
more conveniently served from a privately owned system, the 
pipeline of which goes through it, and in which the petitioner is a 
large owner. The nearest fire hydrant maintained by the town is 
about a mile distant. The land is about a mile from the business 
section of the town. There is no paving or sidewalk or other 
improvements abutting or near the land, although it abuts on an 
abandoned state highway which is now being maintained by the 
town. Power and light services are available, but these are 
furnished by a private concern and not by the town government. 
In Kennecott Copper Corporation ~. City of Bingham Canyon, 18 Utah2d 
60, 415 P . 2d 209 ( 1966) , this court had occasion to take another look at the 
material factors. The court said: 
In the disconnected area there are no dwellings, no 
inhabitants, and there is no reasonable prospect of any such use in 
the future. The City has heretofore furnished police and fire 
protection, waste and garbage collection, sewage disposal facilities, 
and has maintained roads and streets. The plaintiff contends that 
because no one lives in that area there will be no disadvantage to 
the loss of these services; and that the necessary extension of its 
mining operations has been seriously hampered because of various 
factors, including the city's requirements relating to zoning 
regulations and construction permits. 
The decree of disconnection was upheld despite the fact that the city 
expected to lose about $28, 000 a year in sales and use taxes. In discussing 
the meaning of "justice and equity, 11 the court said that the facts of each 
case must, to a very large extent, determine that question, and in 
determining that question the court noted that there was no 11interdependent 
relationship" between the property in question and the city of such a nature 
as to warrant denial of the petition . 
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After its decision in Kennecott Copper, the court decided In The Matter 
of The Disconnection of Territory from Layton City, 27 Utah2d 241, 494 P. 2d 
948 (1972). The decision of the trial court disconnecting the territory was 
upheld by this court, which said: 
At the time of pretrial some issues of fact were agreed to by 
the parties as follows: (1) There are no improvements or buildings 
upon the territory sought to be disconnected and the only road is 
an unimproved county road on the easterly boundary of the land; 
( 2) Layton City provides no water, garbage service or sewer 
service to the territory; ( 3) The nearest city waterline is 
approximately 400 feet from the boundary of the petitioner's 
property; ( 4) The city provides fire protection to the territory; 
(5) That 'the part of the petitioner's property lying outside the 
boundaries of the city is being developed by the petitioner and East 
Layton Town is providing sewer and water service to that part of 
the tract. 
In addition to the stipulated facts, the trial court on the basis of 
evidence produced at the hearing, made the following findings: 
that topography of the petitioner's entire tract of land made it 
desirable that the subject property be developed as a part of the 
entire parcel for residential purposes and that the territory prior to 
the commencement of these proceedings was unimproved and 
uninhabited and had not been used for other than agricultural 
purposes . The court also found there were no city streets, 
improvements or buildings within the territory and that the city 
supplied no substantial municipal services to the area. The court 
further found that the city will not suffer substantial loss of tax 
revenue, nor will its municipal functions be in any substantial way 
effected or impaired by the disconnection. Based upon these 
findings the court concluded that justice and equity required that a 
decree be entered disconnecting the territory in question from 
Layton City. 
On the basis of those admitted and established facts, this court upheld 
the decree of disconnection. 
Disconnection was also decreed, and the decree upheld, in Howard v. 
Town of North Salt Lake, 7 Utah2d 278, 323 P. 2d 261 (1958). The findings 
supporting the decree were that the town had been organized primarily to 
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provide a culinary water system; that the town had spent substantial money 
to acquire and develop the water supplies, but no part of the facilities 
extended into the area disconnected; that there were no houses in the area; 
that the only structures were those used by industrial facilities; that there 
were no sidewalks, curbs or gutters; that none of the property had been 
planted or subdivided for residential development; that the two principal 
roads in the area were maintained by the State of Utah and Davis County; 
that one of the plaintiffs, Salt Lake Refining Company, constructed its own 
road from the public streets of Salt Lake City to its plant; no water was 
being furnished to any industry or person within the disconnected area; that 
North Salt Lake would be able to furnish Salt Lake Refining Company water 
for culinary purposes but not for its industrial requirements; that the town 
had no fire fighting facilities; that its town marshall worked one shift per day 
but did no patrolling within the refinery area; that no garbage removal was 
conducted by the town within the disconnected area; and that the 
disconnection would not destroy the symmetry of its boundaries. See also, In 
re Smithfield City, 70 Utah 564, 262 P. 105 (1927); In re Fullmer, 33 Utah 
43, 92 P. 768 (1907); and Christensen v. Town of Clearfield, 66 Utah 455, 
243 P. 376 (1926). 
There are two Utah cases in which disconnection petitions were denied, 
in whole or in part, and the denial was upheld by this court. They are In 
Re Chief Consolidated Mining Co. , 71 Utah 430, 266 P. 1044 (1928), and 
Continental Bank and Trust Company ~· Farmington City, 599 P. 2d 1242 
(Utah 1979). In both of these cases the petition for disconnection was denied 
because of the interdependence of the territory and of the municipality. In 
the first case, there was a close relationship between the mining activities 
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and the municipal services being provided within the city, and in the second 
case there was a close relationship between the city's providing of police and 
security forces, culinary water, and traffic control, and the need for the city 
to respond to emergencies in an amusement park. There was also evidence 
that Farmington had become increasingly dependent upon the park for tax 
revenues. In both of the cases it appeared that disconnection would have a 
very serious effect upon the remaining part of the municipality, and that the 
municipality had committed itself and provided various services to the areas 
within the territory. The cases represent a fairly common view as expressed 
by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Bisenius v. City of Randolph, 82 Neb. 
520, 118 N. W. 127, as follows: 
* * * The test of whether "justice and equity" requires such 
disconnection is whether the land has a unity of interest with the 
platted portion of the municipality and the maintenance of a 
municipal government * * *· 
In the present case there is no symbiotic relationship between the 
territory and the remaining parts of the municipality, there is no 
interdependence, and there is no unity of interest. The evidence, taken as a 
whole, indicates that the city's desire to retain the territory within the 
boundaries of the municipality is based al.most entirely upon its desire to 
control all future use of the property. The property is remote from the 
center of the city, it receives no substantial services from the city, it has no 
residents, and it receives no benefit from being included within the city 
limits. The facts established at the trial closely parallel those in the many 
cases in which this court has approved a finding that justice and equity 
require that the territory be disconnected. And, as this court stated in City 
of Draper, supra: 
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In ruling on a petition for disconnection, the trial court's 
findings of fact will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. 
Kennecott Copper ~. y. City of Bingham Canyon, 18 Utah2d 60, 
415 P. 2d 209 (1966). The burden is on the appellant to 
demonstrate that the trial court committed error, and not that 
appellant should have won its case. We review the evidence, and 
the inferences arising therefrom to favor the trial court's findings 
of fact, Ovard y. Cannon, Utah, 600 P. 2d 1246 ( 1979); Rogers v. 
Hansen, Utah, 580 P. 2d 233 ( 1978) . 
III 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED HIGHLAND CITY'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL AND ITS MOTION ro AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER. 
At the time the petition was filed in this proceeding, at the time of the 
trial, at the time the court filed its memorandum decision on August 28, 1980, 
at the time the commission met, and it is not known for how long thereafter, 
the territory was on the eastern outskirts of the city. 
During the pendency of the proceeding, the city negotiated with 
Joseph A. Kjar respecting annexation by the city of the Kjar property which 
lies to the east of the territory. At the trial, Mr. Kjar testified that he had 
talked with Mayor LeBaron about a possible annexation, indicating that he 
desired to be included within the city, but was told by the Mayor that "this 
action was pending, and that until it was resolved we couldn't very well move 
completely on that request" (R. 378). 
Nevertheless the city must have continued to talk with Mr. Kjar, and 
before the formal findings of fact, conclusions of . law, and decree were 
entered, the city had annexed the Kjar property. On this basis, the city 
moved for a new trial, or for amendment of the findings, conclusions, and 
decree on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The court denied the 
motion and its denial is assigned as error by Highland City. 
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In numerous cases this court has announced and applied the rule that 
the granting or denying of a motion for a new trial is a matter that lies 
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the action of the trial 
court will not be overturned unless it appears that the action was arbitrary 
or that it clearly transgressed any reasonable bounds of discretion. See Lee 
v. Howes, 548 P. 2d 619, 621 (Utah 1976); Smith y. Shreeve, 551 P. 2d 1261, 
1262 (Utah 1976); and--Page y. Utah Home Fire Insurance Company, 15 Utah2d 
257, 391 P. 2d 290, 292 ( 1964). Where a motion for a new trial is based upon 
newly discovered evidence, the exercise of discretion by the trial court must 
be based on a showing of substantial material evidence, from which it appears 
there is at least a reasonable likelihood that it would affect the result in a 
new trial. Uptown Appliance and Radio Company v. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 
249 P.2d 826, 828 (1952). 
Although Rule 59 provides that when a new trial motion is made, the 
court may open the judgment and take additional testimony, the motion to 
reopen is also addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See 
Lewis y. Porter, 556 P.2d 496, 497 (1976). 
The City regards the evidence as important because annexation of the 
additional 80 acres of property changed the configuration of the city, 
resulting in an "unreasonable, large or varied-shaped peninsular land mass" 
projecting into the boundaries of Highland City, or in creation of an island. 
The possibility of such an annexation was presented during the trial when 
Joseph A. Kjar testified that he was interested in having his property 
annexed by the city. Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that the 
receipt of this evidence upon reopening of the case would have resulted in a 
different finding by the court. Moreover, the evidence sought to be 
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produced by Highland City is not "newly discovered evidence" within the 
meaning of Rule 59. In Patrick ~. Sedwick, 413 P. 2d 169, 177 (Alaska 1976), 
a medical malpractice case, the defendant doctor contended on appeal that the 
trial court had erred in denying his motion for a new trial which was based 
on the ground that, since the trial, there had been discovery of a new 
medical technique which would have changed the prospects of the plaintiff and 
would have reduced the amount of damages awarded. The court set out the 
general grounds for the granting of a new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered· evidence, that it must be such as would probably change the 
result on a new trial; must have been discovered since the trial; must be of 
such a nature that it would have not been discovered before trial by due 
diligence; must be material; and must not be merely culmative or impeaching. 
In upholding the action of the trial court in denying the motion for a 
new trial, the court observed: 
In addition to the foregoing requirements, it is established 
that for any evidence to come within the category of "newly 
discovered" such evidence must relate to facts which were in 
existence at the time of the trial. 
See also Campbell ~. American Foreign SS Corp. , 116 F. 2d 926, 928 
(2 Cir. 1941), in which Judge Swan stated: 
* * * The facts alleged in support of the motion do not 
constitute 1tnewly discovered evidence" within the rule. That 
phrase refers to evidence of facts in existence at the time of the 
trial, of which the aggrieved party was excusably ignorant. If it 
were ground for a new trial that facts occurring subsequent to the 
trial have shown that the expert witnesses made an inaccurate 
prophecy of the prospective disability of the plaintiff, the litigation 
would never come to an end. The weight of authority is against 
the granting of a new trial on the ground of u~expecte.d 
improvement in the plaintiff's condition, unless the evidence is 
sufficient to show fraud. 
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See also 6A Moore's Federal Practice (2d Ed.), 1f 59.08(3), p. 59-115. 
In the present case the city has had in its power to make changes in the 
facts, and has done so on at least two occasions since the filing of the 
petition. In each case the changes in the facts, brought about by the city, 
have been used as a basis for argument against disconnection. First, prior 
to trial, the city negotiated a lease with Utah Power and Light Company for 
certain property lying within the territory to be disconnected, and sought to 
establish that fact as a reason for not permitting the disconnection. Then, 
after the trial was concluded, and apparently after all hearings were 
concluded, the city took steps to annex other property which would change 
the boundaries to such an extent that it might argue, as it did in its motion 
for a new trial and has on this appeal, that the trial should go for naught. 
The case does not reach the standards of the Alaska case, cited above, 
-
because the newly discovered evidence was not something that just happened, 
but something that the city made happen. The city's ability to "manage" the 
evidence should not lead to a conclusion that "justice and equity" require that 
the territory not be disconnected, nor does it show that enforcement of the 
judgment would no longer be "equitable" if the motion is treated as one under 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
This action was fully and fairly tried. Except for an opinion of the 
Mayor of North Salt Lake, all of the evidence "deemed relevant'• by the city 
and by the intervenors was listened to by the court. But legislation 
permitting the city to present such evidence as it deems to be relevant, does 
not make it relevant. If it did it would be impossible for a court to reach a 
rational decision in a case of this type. The city argues that the court in its 
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memorandum decision indicated that the evidence with respect to the feelings 
of the residents in Highland City, the hopes of the Mayor, and vague plans 
for the future were not considered, but the court's language could also mean 
that in light of the other evidence in the case these matters were not 
sufficient to have a bearing upon the question of whether "justice and equity" 
required disconnection of the territory. This conclusion is consistent with 
the many cases decided by this court under prior statutes, where "justice 
and equity" was substantially the only criteria, and the present one, adopted 
in 1971, in which the legislature has dilineated the factors that should be 
taken into account by the court in determining whether "justice and equity" 
require disconnection. 
Although the legislation provides that the factors specifically enumerated 
in 10-2-503 are not the only factors to be taken into consideration by the 
court, rules of statutory construction require a holding that the statute, 
properly construed, contemplates that the other factors to be taken into 
account will be those that are similar to the ones enumerated, and that are 
related to the question of whether or not n disconnection will leave the 
municipality with a· residual area within its boundaries for which the cost, 
requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would materially increase 
over previous years or for which it would become economically or practically 
unreasonable to administer as a municipality." All the factors going to that 
question were considered by the court and the court on the basis of the 
evidence concluded that "justice and equity" did in fact require disconnection 
of the territory from Highland City. 
The motion for a new trial is based upon evidence which is not in fact 
"newly discovered evidence" and which, because related evidence was 
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produced at the trial, was not likely to change the result of the trial. The 
refusal to grant a new trial was not an abuse of the trial court's broad 
discretion. 
In light of the foregoing, the judgment and decree of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
. Roe 
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